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Essays on Asset Management 
Chapter 1:  
The Pitfalls of Going Public: New Evidence from Hedge Funds 
Lin Sun and Melvyn Teo 
Abstract: Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by 
unlisted firms. We argue that since the new shareholders of a listed management company 
typically do not invest alongside the limited partners of the funds managed, the process of 
going public breaks the incentive alignment between ownership, control, and investment 
capital, thereby engendering agency problems. In line with the agency explanation, the 
underperformance is more severe for funds that have low manager total deltas, low 
governance scores, and no manager personal capital, or that are managed by firms whose 
stock prices are more sensitive to earnings news. Post IPO, listed firms aggressively raise 
capital by launching multiple new funds. Consequently, despite the underperformance, listed 
firms harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. Investors continue to 
subscribe to hedge funds managed by listed firms as they appear to offer lower operational 
risk.  
 
Chapter 2:  
Overpriced Stocks and Hedge Fund Performance 
Lin Sun 
Abstract: Using the mispricing measure constructed by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), I 
find that propensity to hold mispriced stocks reflect hedge fund managerial ability. Hedge 
funds hold most overpriced stocks underperform hedge funds hold least overpriced stocks by 
     iii 
  
3.00% per annual after adjusting for risk. Propensity of hedge funds to hold more overpriced 
stock is persistent over the next quarter. Hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks are 
more prone to disposition effect and trade more actively. 
 
Chapter 3:  
On the Performance of Hedge Funds Charging Zero Performance Fee 
Lin Sun 
Abstract: Hedge funds charging zero performance fee significantly underperform hedge funds 
charging non-zero performance fee by 3.79% per annual. Hedge funds charging zero 
performance fee take higher systematic risk, invest less distinctively relative to their peers, 
and implement more scalable strategies. The presence of a performance fee increases the 
flow-performance sensitivity in both the low performance and high performance terciles. 
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Abstract 
 
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted 
firms. We argue that since the new shareholders of a listed management company typically 
do not invest alongside the limited partners of the funds managed, the process of going public 
breaks the incentive alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby 
engendering agency problems. In line with the agency explanation, the underperformance is 
more severe for funds that have low manager total deltas, low governance scores, and no 
manager personal capital, or that are managed by firms whose stock prices are more sensitive 
to earnings news. Post IPO, listed firms aggressively raise capital by launching multiple new 
funds. Consequently, despite the underperformance, listed firms harvest greater fee revenues 
than do comparable unlisted firms. Investors continue to subscribe to hedge funds managed 
by listed firms as they appear to offer lower operational risk.  
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1.1. Introduction 
“When a fund management company lists on a stock exchange, its clients are not uniformly 
delighted. They are aware that potential conflicts of interest can arise that some companies 
fail to manage. ”  
–The Financial Times, July 20121 
“Public listings can lead to a fundamental tension between large investors who select funds 
for strong returns long term and shareholders who clamor for quarterly earnings increases and 
constantly monitor the stock price.”  
–The Wall Street Journal, June 20112 
In the recent years, we have witnessed a slew of public listings by large asset 
management firms including Man Group, Fortress Investment Group, Och-Ziff Capital 
Management Group, Blackstone Group, and KKR.
3
 How does the transition to public equity 
markets impact investment performance? On one hand, fund management companies argue 
that going public allows them to boost investment performance by better incentivizing and 
motivating their employees through employee stock options, and by investing the IPO 
proceeds in superior technology and business support. Moreover, listed firms may be 
operationally more robust than their unlisted competitors given the higher level of 
transparency required of listed companies. On the other hand, fund investors contend that 
public listings allow firm founders to sell off their stakes in their fund management 
companies to outsiders, which exacerbates potential conflicts of interests. In this paper, we 
                                                          
1
 “Going public brings benefits and pitfalls,” The Financial Times, 22 July 2012.  
2
  “For private equity clients, worries over public listing,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2011.  
3
 By our estimates, at the end of 2013 about 16.68 percent of hedge fund industry assets are managed by funds 
run by listed firms. 
     3 
  
contribute to this debate by investigating the impact on hedge fund performance when asset 
management firms go public.  
The hedge fund industry is an interesting laboratory for studying the impact of initial 
public offerings on investment performance in asset management. First, hedge funds, both 
public and private, typically report monthly return data to commercial databases. This allows 
us to cleanly measure investment performance and compare the performance of funds 
managed by publicly listed firms with those managed by comparable privately held firms.
4
 In 
contrast, the corporate finance literature traditionally suffers from a dearth of information on 
private firms. Even when data on private firms are available, e.g., via Sageworks, they are 
often anonymized, and therefore, do not allow researchers to observe the transition from 
private to public. Second, it is difficult to run a comparable analysis on private equity funds 
as traditional performance metrics in private equity such as IRR or investment multiple are 
measured over a ten-year horizon, effectively precluding researchers from analyzing the 
performance implications of the transition in a timely fashion. Third, agency problems are 
more extreme with hedge funds than with mutual funds owing to the complex strategies 
employed by and the lower level of transparency and disclosure of the former.
5
  
Indeed, hedge funds and private equity funds (and to a lesser extent mutual funds) that 
are managed by publicly listed firms need to contend with a rich set of agency issues: the 
problems that surface between management and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and the conflicts that arise between management and investors (Bollen 
and Pool, 2008, 2009; Teo, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2016). Hedge fund investors have 
traditionally relied on co-investment by managers to create incentive alignment and 
                                                          
4
 Our results are robust to adjustments for the backfill bias (Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014), self-
selection bias (Fung and Hsieh, 2009), and illiquidity induced serial correlation of returns (Getmansky, Lo, and 
Makarov, 2004) that afflict self-reported hedge fund return data. 
5
 In line with this view, we find that our baseline results are economically weaker but still statistically significant 
(at the five percent level for equal-weighted portfolios and at the one percent level for value-weighted 
portfolios) with actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. 
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ameliorate agency problems that stem from conflicts between general partners and limited 
partners.
6
 However, the process of going public breaks the incentive alignment since the new 
shareholders typically do not invest alongside the limited partners. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
separation of ownership, control, and investment capital when a hedge fund firm goes 
public.
7
 
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
Our results are striking. We find substantial differences in expected returns, on the 
portfolios of hedge funds sorted by fund management company listing status, that are 
unexplained by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed 
firms underperform hedge funds managed by unlisted firms by 2.89 percent per year (t-
statistic = 4.73) after adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. 
The results are not confined to the smallest funds in our sample and cannot be explained by 
differences in fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004), 
return smoothing behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004), fees (Agarwal, Daniel, and 
Naik, 2009), share restrictions and illiquidity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan, 2012), and 
backfill and incubation bias (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and 
Rouwenhorst, 2014).  
We find using a differences-in-differences analysis that relative to the five-year period 
before IPO, average fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by 13.68 percent per annum 
while average firm alpha wanes by 8.04 percent per annum during the five-year period 
following the IPO. Despite the post-event underperformance, listed firms harvest fee 
                                                          
6
 According to Luba Nikulina from Towers Watson, “Capital commitment by fund managers is the single most 
important way to align the interests of managers and investors.” See “Skin in the game is crucial, but how 
much?” Financial Times, 18 November 2012.  
7
 Typically a privately held hedge fund firm is controlled by its founders, i.e., owners, who also invest a 
substantial percentage of their net worth in the funds managed by the firm. Hence the tight link between 
ownership, control, and investment capital. Post-IPO, this link is broken as the founders of the firm sell-out to 
new shareholders who neither invest alongside the limited partners nor manage the hedge funds run by the firm.  
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revenues that are US$3.48 million greater than comparable private firms. This is because 
relative to the control group, they are able to grow their assets under management (henceforth 
AUM) by US$340.95 million or 61.49 percent during the same period. The surge in firm 
AUM stems less from organic growth in existing fund AUM and more from the launch of 
new funds post listing. After listing, existing fund AUM ratchets up by US$144 million, but 
the AUM increase is still lower than that for funds in the control group. At the same time, the 
number of new funds per firm increases from 3.34 funds to 6.37 funds, which is 2.77 funds 
per firm greater than that for comparable firms. Indeed, we show that after controlling for a 
variety of factors, being listed increases the chance that a firm will launch a new fund by 
30.65 percent. 
What drives the underperformance of hedge funds managed by listed firms? In line 
with an agency story that centers on conflicts between management and investors, we observe 
substantial differences in the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms for funds 
sorted on metrics that are known to ameliorate agency problems. Specifically, the alpha 
spread between funds managed by listed versus those managed by unlisted firms is larger for 
funds that are more susceptible to agency: funds with low manager total deltas (Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik, 2009), funds with poor governance scores (Ozik and Sadka, 2016), and 
funds without co-investment by the manager. 
How do the aforementioned agency problems translate into fund underperformance? 
We argue that post-IPO, the drive to gather assets (Yin, 2016; Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 
2016; Fung et al., 2016) may explain the underperformance of listed firms.
8
 We find that 
consistent with the asset gathering view, the underperformance is most severe for funds with 
                                                          
8
 A firm that focuses on gathering assets may underperform as its founding partners may be less motivated to 
maintain a stellar track record once asset gathering has begun or may by distracted by the demands associated 
with managing a larger business. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) document 
the importance of manager motivation to fund performance while Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016) measure the impact 
of manager inattention on fund alpha.  
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the greatest capacity to gather assets, i.e., funds that take on little liquidity risk and therefore 
are less affected by capacity constraints (Berk and Green, 2004). The underperformance of 
the funds managed by listed firms, relative to those managed by unlisted firms, is 6.66 
percent per annum for funds in the lowest Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta 
quintile but only 2.89 percent per annum for funds in the highest liquidity beta quintile.  
Are the agency problems that arise in publicly managed hedge funds also driven by 
the conflicts between management and shareholders? We hypothesize that the short-termist 
pressures associated with a stock listing (Poterba and Summers, 1995; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005) may also drive the underperformance and excessive asset gathering of 
publicly traded asset management firms. As argued by Narayanan (1985), Miller and Rock 
(1985), Stein (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Von Thadden (1995) and Holmström 
(1999), a focus on a firm’s short term profits or current stock price will distort firm decisions 
from the first-best if investors have incomplete information on how the firm should grow to 
maximize its long term value. Short-termist pressures can induce excessive asset gathering 
since asset gathering boosts current fee revenues (or current firm earnings) at the expense of 
future returns (or future earnings). To test the short-termism view, we follow Asker, Farre-
Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and measure the sensitivity of stock price to earnings news 
using “earnings response coefficients” or ERC (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and Zmijewski, 
1989). If short-termism explains the underperformance and excessive asset gathering of listed 
firms, we should find that underperformance and asset gathering increase with ERC. This is 
precisely what we find. High ERC firms whose stock prices are more responsive to earnings 
underperform more, raise more capital, and launch more funds post listing, than do low ERC 
firms.  
Why do hedge fund investors continue to subscribe to funds managed by listed firms 
in light of their underperformance? One view is that given the level of transparency that is 
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required of a publicly listed firm, hedge funds managed by listed firms may score better in 
terms of operational risk metrics. In line with this view, hedge funds managed by listed firms 
are less likely to trigger three of the four most common performance flags observed by 
Bollen and Pool (2012). Specifically, funds managed by listed firms are 3.6 percent less 
likely to feature return distributions with a discontinuity at zero, 3.2 percent less likely to 
report a low number of negative returns, and 7.7 percent less likely to report a high number of 
repeated returns. Moreover, the differences in rejection rates are statistically significant at the 
one percent level for the aforementioned indicators of fraud risk. 
Can the endogeneity of firm listing engender the underperformance of hedge funds 
managed by public firms? The event study by analyzing the private to public transition allows 
us to sidestep concerns that time-invariant differences between public and private firms 
simultaneously explain listing status and fund underperformance. Similarly, the differences-
in-differences methodology that we employ help ameliorate concerns that observable time-
varying differences in firm characteristics drive our findings. To cater for the possibility that 
unobserved time-varying differences between public and private firms might concurrently 
affect the decision to go public or stay private and fund investment performance, we run an 
instrumental variables analysis with the supply of capital at firm founding as the instrument.
9
 
The impact of listing on fund performance is even larger after instrumenting for listing status, 
suggesting that the endogeneity of listing status does not drive our findings. 
The results in this paper challenge the view that asset management firms go public so 
as to better motivate and incentivize their employees. In doing so, we resonate with the three 
strands of research in the hedge fund literature. The first strand examines agency problems 
                                                          
9
 To proxy for the supply of capital at firm founding, we use firm investment strategy flow during the 24-month 
period after firm inception. As alternative instruments, we also use firm strategy flow during the 12-month 
period before inception as well as firm strategy flow during the 12-month period after inception. The 
instrumental variables regression results are robust to our choice of instrument.   
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and finds that some hedge funds tend to misreport their returns (Bollen and Pool, 2008; 2009), 
take on excessive liquidity risk (Teo, 2011), and strategically delay reporting poor returns 
(Aragon and Nanda, 2016). Our findings indicate that the process of going public heightens 
the conflicts of interests between managers and investors by disrupting the alignment of 
incentives. A second strand focuses on capital raising and argues that there are strong direct 
(Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016) incentives that drive hedge fund 
managers to raise capital. It also finds that the majority of industry assets are managed by a 
few successful mega hedge fund firms (Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh, 2013) and that hedge fund 
firms grow by leveraging on successful first funds to raise follow-on funds at better terms 
(Fung et al., 2016). Our results suggest that firms that go public are even more motivated to 
gather assets. They do so principally by aggressively launching new funds. The third strand 
sheds light on the drivers of alpha in the hedge fund industry. We find that just like motivated 
(Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), geographically 
proximate (Teo, 2009), and attentive (Lu, Ray, and Teo, 2016) funds, those managed by 
private firms also tend to outperform.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on initial public offerings. Researchers 
have shown that going public hurts the performance of industry competitors (Hsu, Reed, and 
Rocholl, 2010), impairs an issuer’s credit ratings (Kedia, Rajgopal, and Zhou, 2014), lowers 
the quality of firm internal innovation (Bernstein, 2015), and reduces the sensitivity of 
corporate investment to investment opportunities (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015). 
Yet little is known about the effect of going public on fund investment performance. Our 
work addresses this important gap in the literature. We also add to work on short-termism 
pressures in public firms that started with survey evidence presented by Poterba and 
Summers (1995) and Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), and culminated in empirical 
work by Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015). We show that the pressure that short-
     9 
  
termist shareholders exert on publicly traded asset management firms can undermine 
investment performance and give rise to capital raising incentives. Our findings are distinct 
from those of Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) who show that IPO firms 
do worse than matching listed firms when it comes to long-run post-issue operating 
performance and stock returns, respectively. Indeed, we show that while listed asset 
managers deliver lower returns for their fund investors than do their unlisted competitors, the 
former are able to grow fee revenues relative to the latter, which benefits their shareholders.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis while Section 4 
presents a myriad of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.2. Data and methodology 
We evaluate the impact of hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee returns and assets 
under management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge datasets from January 1994 to December 2013. Because TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information 
on funds that died before January 1994. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this 
bias by focusing on data from January 1994 onward. 
In our fund universe, we have a total of 30,509 hedge funds, of which 12,380 are live 
funds and 18,129 are dead funds. However, due to concerns that funds with multiple share 
classes could cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.
10
 This 
                                                          
10
 Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. To merge 
databases, we follow the procedure outlined in the Appendix of Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2016).  
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leaves a total of 16,592 hedge funds, of which 5,947 are live funds and 10,645 are dead funds 
at the end of our sample period. The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge. While 5,547 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong to only 
one database. Specifically, there are 3,597, 3,446 and 4,002 funds unique to the TASS, HFR, 
and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining data 
from more than one source. In addition to monthly return and size information, our sample 
also captures data on fund characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, 
redemption period, lock-up period, investment style, leverage indicator, high-water mark 
indicator, and fund age.
11
 
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), we classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi-process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued 
securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take 
positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple strategies that take 
advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, 
mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. 
Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, 
equities, and bonds in the futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on 
spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure.  
We hand collect the fund management companies’ public listing status from several 
sources. The primary data sources are S&P Capital IQ and Factiva news search. We 
supplemented this with other Internet sources including: SEC’s Investment Adviser Public 
                                                          
11
 To ameliorate the impact of return outliers on our analysis we trim the hedge fund returns in our sample at the 
99.5
th
 and 0.5
th
 percentiles. The baseline results are virtually unchanged when we using the original returns 
reported in the databases or when we winsorize the returns at the 99.5
th
 and at the 0.5
th
 percentiles.  
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Disclosure website as well as the fund management company official website.
12
 Specifically, 
for each fund management company, we perform a search in S&P Capital IQ and SEC’s 
Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, which provide information about the company’s 
current and prior parent / corporate parents. Once we identify a subsidiary and parent 
relationship, we identify the effective public listing date for the fund management company 
by checking the “M&A/Private Placements” section in S&P Capital IQ, conducting a Factiva 
news search, and perusing the corporate history from fund management company’s website. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of listed firms as well as the 
number of hedge funds and the size of the hedge fund assets that they manage. While the 
number of listed fund management companies is small relative to the number of unlisted fund 
management companies, listed fund management companies manage a growing number of 
hedge funds and pool of assets. In 1994, there were only 12 listed firms managing 39 hedge 
funds and US$2.55 billion of assets. In 2013, the number of listed firms has grown to 113. 
These firms manage 856 hedge funds and US$199.34 billion of assets. At end of our sample 
period, listed firms manage 16.68 percent of industry assets, a significant increase from 4.02 
percent of hedge fund industry assets at the start of the sample period.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Our firm sample covers a broad spectrum of fund management companies including 
large asset management houses that also manage private equity funds and mutual funds. This 
allows us to shed light on impact of public listings on the asset management industry in 
general. One concern is that for some of these firms their hedge fund assets may be a 
relatively small part of their business. Consequently, the impact of hedge fund performance, 
fee revenues, and AUM on these firms may be relatively muted. To ameliorate such concerns, 
                                                          
12
 For the SEC’s Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website see http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/
Content/Search/iapd_Search.aspx 
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we follow Brunnemeier and Nagel (2004) and discard some firms for whom hedge fund 
assets only make up a small part of their aggregated institutional portfolio. We first check 
whether a firm is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is a 
prerequisite for conduct of non-hedge fund business. If a firm is not registered, we include it 
in our pure play sample. If a firm is registered, we obtain its registration documents (Form 
ADV). For a registered firm to be included in our pure play hedge fund firm sample, we 
require that (a) that it charges performance-based fees, and (b) at least 50 percent of its clients 
are “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net worth individuals”. 
This leaves us with a total of 96 listed and 1,888 unlisted pure play firms at the end of the 
sample period. In unreported results that are available upon request, our baseline findings 
also apply when we analyze only pure play hedge fund firms.  
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009). 
These biases stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a 
result, there is a self-selection bias. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period 
during which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. 
Incubated funds with successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund 
databases while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Separate from 
this, when a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, 
because successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these 
backfilled returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the analysis that 
follows, we will repeat the tests after dropping the first 24 months of return data from each 
fund so as to ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. To fully address 
concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, 
we also redo the tests after removing all return observations that have been backfilled prior to 
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fund listing date, which necessitates that we confine the fund sample to databases with data 
on fund listing date, namely TASS and HFR.  
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as 
the difference between the Russell 2000 and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 indices; the 
yield spread of the US ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted 
for duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s 
BAA bond over the ten-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration 
(BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on 
currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are 
constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see 
Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been 
shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund 
returns. 
 
1.3. Empirical analysis 
1.3.1. Tests of fund performance 
To begin, we test for differences in risk-adjusted performance between funds 
managed by listed and unlisted management companies. Every month, starting in January 
1994, two hedge fund portfolios are formed based on whether the hedge fund is managed by 
a listed or unlisted company.  The post-formation returns on these two portfolios are linked 
     14 
  
across months to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the 
performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.   
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected 
returns, on the portfolios sorted by management company listing status, that are unexplained 
by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed companies 
underperform those managed by unlisted firms by a statistically significant but modest 1.89 
percent per year (t-statistic = 3.13). As in the rest of the paper, we base statistical inferences 
on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. After adjusting for co-
variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread increases to an 
economically significant 2.89 percent per year (t-statistic = 4.73).
13
 Since hedge funds with 
investor capital below US$20 million may not be relevant to large institutional investors, we 
also conduct the portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with at least US$20 million of 
AUM. The results reported in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that our findings are not driven by 
the smallest funds in the sample.
14
 
[Insert Table 2 and Fig. 2 here] 
Fig. 2 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly 
cumulative average residuals (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of funds managed by 
listed firms (portfolio A) and the portfolio of funds managed by unlisted firms (portfolio B). 
CAR is the cumulative difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings 
(estimated over the entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk 
factors. The CARs in Fig. 2 indicate that portfolio A consistently underperforms portfolio B 
                                                          
13
 The portfolio sort results are robust to value-weighting the funds within each portfolio. The risk-adjusted 
spread for the value-weighted sort is 2.75 percent per annum (t-statistic = 4.20).  
14
 The portfolio sort results are not driven solely by the underperformance of funds launched post IPO by listed 
firms. We redo our portfolio sort with only funds that were conceived prior to firm listing and find that these 
funds post firm IPO underperform funds managed by unlisted firms by 2.54 percent per year after adjusting for 
risk (t-statistic = 2.72). We note that in line with the results from Fung et al. (2016), funds launched post IPO 
underperform funds launched pre IPO, but the performance spread is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
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over the entire sample period and suggest that the underperformance of funds managed by 
listed firms is not peculiar to a particular year. 
There may be concerns that the portfolio sort results are driven by shareholder 
activists as activists that are managed by listed firms may be less willing to exert strong 
pressure on portfolio companies to make shareholder friendly changes given that they 
themselves are vulnerable to shareholder activism.
15
 To address such concerns, we remove 
shareholder activist funds from our sample based on their strategy name, substrategy name, 
fund name, and fund investment strategy description. In total, we have 95 shareholder activist 
funds in our sample. After removing shareholder activists, we find that funds managed by 
listed firms still underperform those managed by unlisted firms by 2.85 percent per annum (t-
statistic = 4.66) after adjusting for risk.  
To further test the performance difference between funds managed by listed and 
unlisted management companies, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression: 
𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻𝐴𝑖𝑚 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷 + 𝑐𝑀𝐺𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑑𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝑓𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +
𝑔log(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑚−1) + ℎ𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑘𝑆𝑇𝑌𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑙𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑙
𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚
 
(1) 
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, LISTED is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one when a fund is managed by a listed firm and a value of zero otherwise, MGTFEE is fund 
management fee in percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE is 
fund redemption notification period in months, MININV is fund minimum investment in 
millions of US$, SIZE is fund monthly AUM in millions of US$, AGE is fund age in decades, 
STYLEDUM is fund style dummy, and YEARDUM is year dummy. The log(SIZE) variable 
                                                          
15
 This is in line with the saying “People in glass houses do not like to throw stones,” which has been used to 
describe the behavior of publicly listed institutional investors. See “It was the hedge fund managers who got off 
the fence,” Financial Times, 12 March 2005.  
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captures capacity constraints at the fund level (Berk and Green, 2004). MGTFEE and 
PERFFEE capture the impact of fund incentives on managerial performance (Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik, 2009) while NOTICE caters for the view expounded by Aragon (2007) that 
funds with longer redemption notification periods take on more liquidity risk and therefore 
harvest greater returns. We include AGE as a response to the Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) 
finding that younger funds outperform older funds. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, 
we only include results for funds with at least 24 months of return data.
16
 We also estimate 
the analogous regression on raw monthly fund returns to ensure that our findings are not an 
artifact of the risk adjustment methodology.     
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis are reported in columns one to 
four of Table 3. They corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts and indicate that funds 
run by listed firms underperform those run by unlisted firms. Specifically, the coefficient 
estimate on LISTED in the alpha regression reported in column four of Table 2 indicates that, 
controlling for other factors that could explain fund performance, funds managed by listed 
companies underperform funds managed by unlisted companies by 2.44 percent per annum 
after adjusting for risk. Inferences do not change when we estimate the regression on raw 
returns suggesting that our prior findings are not driven by our risk adjustment technology. 
The coefficient estimates on the control variables accord with the extant literature. Higher-
powered incentives or performance fees (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009) and longer 
redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) are associated with superior performance while 
fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) is linked to poorer performance. The impact of fund 
                                                          
16
 Our results prevail when we estimate fund alpha using the past 36 months of returns instead.  
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size on performance is more ambiguous. While size is associated with lower fund returns 
(Berk and Green, 2004), it is also linked to higher fund alphas.
17
 
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place 
of the OLS regressions. Specifically, first we run cross-sectional regressions for each month. 
Then, we report the time-series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time-series 
standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth regressions 
control for correlation in residuals across different firms within the same month. We compute 
the standard errors using the method of Newey and West (1987) with a three-month lag to 
adjust for dependence across time. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in 
columns five to eight of Table 3 echo our previous findings and indicate that they are robust 
to alternative model specifications. 
1.3.2. Event study 
To complement the baseline portfolio sorts in the previous subsection, we conduct an 
event study to investigate fund performance and assets under management before and after an 
asset management firm lists on the stock market. We choose as the event window the period 
starting 60 months prior to the IPO and ending 60 months after the IPO.
18
 To be included in 
the sample, a fund must have monthly return information during the 48-month period that 
starts 24 months pre-IPO and ends 24 months post-IPO. This leaves us with 58 funds that 
belong to 27 firms with sufficient return information. To account for endogeneity concerns 
driven by observable differences between listed and unlisted firms, we match event hedge 
funds with non-event hedge funds based on fund performance and fund AUM in the 24-
                                                          
17
 Diseconomies of scale at the firm level do not explain our findings. In unreported results that are available 
upon request, we show that the pooled OLS regression findings are robust to including the log of lagged firm 
AUM as an additional independent variable. 
18
 Our differences-in-differences results are robust to using an event window that starts 48 months prior to the 
IPO and ends 48 months after the IPO.  
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month pre-IPO period and conduct a differences-in-differences analysis. Panel A of Table 4 
reports differences in fund alpha and AUM before and after the IPO relative to the matched 
sample. We also match event firms with non-event firms based on firm performance, firm 
AUM, firm revenue, and number of funds per firm, and report the results from a differences-
in-differences analysis of these firm attributes in Panel B of Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results reported in Table 4 indicate that relative to the five-year period before IPO 
and to a matched sample of funds, fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by 13.68 
percent per annum during the five-year period following the IPO.
19
 The reduction in fund 
performance is economically meaningful and statistically significant at the one percent level. 
At the same time and relative to comparable firms, listed firm risk-adjusted performance 
wanes by 8.04 percent per annum. These results suggest that the drop in performance may be 
driven more by the smaller funds than by the larger funds managed by listed firms.  
Do the lower alphas of listed firms translate to lower fee revenues for these asset 
management companies? We find that despite the deterioration in performance, relative to 
their unlisted competitors, listed firms are able to harvest fee revenues that are US$3.48 
million or 16.76 percent greater than those harvested before listing. This is because compared 
to the control group, they are able to grow their AUM by US$340.95 million or 61.49 percent 
during the same period. The surge in firm AUM stems less from organic growth in existing 
fund AUM and more from the launch of new funds post listing. After listing, existing fund 
AUM ratchets up by US$144 million, but the AUM increase is still lower than that for funds 
                                                          
19
 To reconcile the results from the event study (Table 4) with that of the portfolio sort (Table 2), we rerun the 
portfolio sort with only funds from the event study sample, i.e., funds with at least 24 months of return 
information pre- and post-firm IPO. The results indicate that for this group of funds, the spread between the 
portfolio of funds managed by unlisted firms and that managed by listed firms is 11.03 percent per annum 
after adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. This is consistent with the magnitude of 
the alpha spread reported in Table 4.    
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in the control group. At the same time, the number of new funds per firm increases from 3.34 
funds to 6.37 funds, which is 2.77 funds per firm greater than that for comparable firms. 
Are listed firms more likely to launch additional hedge funds than are unlisted firms 
after controlling for other factors that drive fund launch? To investigate, we estimate probit 
regressions on the probability of launching a new hedge fund or funds in a given year. We 
include as independent variables an indicator variable for whether a firm listed, as well as 
controls for past firm performance over the previous year, the number of funds already 
launched by the firm, standard deviation of monthly firm returns over the previous year, 
aggregate firm flow over the previous year, firm management fee, firm performance fee, firm 
notice period, firm minimum investments, firm age, and log of firm size. Firm management 
fee is simply the value-weighted average management fee of the funds managed by the firm. 
The other firm attributes are constructed analogously. The results reported in Table 5 suggest 
that firms raise additional funds post-IPO. The marginal effects from the regression with firm 
return as a control variable indicate that being listed increases the probability that a firm will 
launch a new fund by 3.27 percentage points.  This result is statistically significant at the one 
percent level and prevails even when we control for firm alpha. In any given year, about 
10.67 percent of firms launch new funds; so being listed increases the chance that a firm will 
launch a new fund by 30.65 percent. The coefficient estimates on the other independent 
variables yield interesting insights. They indicate that firms that (i) are larger, (ii) are younger, 
(iii) set more investor friendly redemption notification terms, and (iv) conceived many funds 
before are more likely to launch additional funds. The first finding accords with standard 
intuition since firms with greater resources are better placed to launch new funds, while the 
last finding is consistent with the results of Fung et al. (2016). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Taken together the findings in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that hedge fund firms derive 
significant benefits from an IPO. They are able to harvest greater fee revenues principally via 
the growth of firm AUM post listing. They do so by launching additional funds and, to a 
lesser extent, by raising the AUM of existing funds. At the same time, investors do not appear 
to benefit from such capital raising activities. We find that both fund and firm performance 
decline sharply during the ten-year period surrounding the firm IPO. 
1.3.3. Fund agency 
The results in the previous subsection are consistent with the view that principal-agent 
problems drive fund behavior around firm IPO. To investigate further, we stratify the fund 
sample based on metrics that are known to moderate conflicts between fund management and 
investors at hedge funds, and redo the portfolio sorts. First, we condition on fund manager 
total delta. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that managers who are operating close to 
their high watermarks, and hence have higher manager total deltas, have incentives that are 
more aligned with those of their investors. Second, we condition on the Ozik and Sadka 
(2016) governance measure from the fund information that we have at the end of the sample. 
The governance measure is based on whether a fund is an onshore fund, features a high 
watermark, registered with the SEC, was audited in the past, and employs a top auditor or a 
top legal counsel.
20
  Better fund governance may help temper agency problems at asset 
management firms and therefore reduce some of the underperformance of hedge funds that 
they manage. Third, we condition on fund manager personal capital, which has been used by 
                                                          
20
 The top law firms and accounting firms are based on: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_100_largest_law_firms_by_revenue 
http://www.accountingmajors.com/accountingmajors/articles/top100.html 
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several researchers to understand the impact of agency on fund manager behavior, e.g., Teo 
(2011).  
We report in Panels A to C of Table 6 the results from the baseline portfolio sorts 
after stratifying the fund sample by the above-mentioned metrics. We find that the alpha 
spreads between funds managed by listed and by unlisted firms are larger for funds that are 
more susceptible to agency problems, i.e., funds with low manager total deltas, funds with 
poor governance scores, and funds without co-investment by the manager, than for funds that 
are less susceptible to agency issues. These results are supportive of the view that the 
underperformance of listed firms is driven by agency problems stemming from conflicts 
between fund management and fund investors.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
1.3.4. Fund asset gathering 
How do the agency problems that surface post IPO engender fund underperformance? 
One view is that fund management companies that go public underperform as they are 
focused on gathering assets and are therefore either less motivated to build on their successful 
track records (since they are busy exploiting them) or are simply distracted by the demands 
associated with managing larger businesses. Recent work has argued that in the absence of 
personal capital there are strong direct (Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 
2016) incentives that drive hedge fund managers to raise capital. Fung et al. (2016) show that 
hedge fund firms that embark on asset gathering via the launch of multiple funds 
underperform other hedge fund firms. Indeed, we have found in the previous subsection that 
relative to their unlisted counterparts, listed firms raise more capital and are more likely 
launch new funds.  
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In this subsection, we explore the agency hypothesis further and investigate the link 
between asset gathering and fund underperformance. We argue that for the asset gathering 
view to hold it must be that underperformance is concentrated amongst funds that have the 
greatest scope or potential for gathering assets. Therefore, we sort funds based on their 
liquidity risk as captured by fund historical Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta. Fund 
historical liquidity beta is estimated in the presence of the factors from the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) model, using the past 24 months of data. Hedge funds with a lower liquidity beta, take 
on less liquidity risk, are less susceptible to capacity constraints (Berk and Green, 2004), and 
therefore have greater potential for gathering assets.  
Table 7 reports the baseline portfolio sorts on five subgroups of funds stratified by 
fund historical Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta. We find that consistent with the 
asset gathering view, the performance differential between funds managed by listed firms and 
those managed by unlisted firms is greatest for funds that take on lower liquidity risk and 
therefore, have fewer constraints on growth. Specifically, after adjusting for covariation with 
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the underperformance of the funds managed by 
listed firms (relative to those managed by unlisted firms) is 6.66 percent per annum for funds 
in the lowest liquidity beta quintile but only 2.89 percent per annum for funds in the highest 
liquidity beta quintile.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
1.3.5 Firm short-termism 
Is the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms also driven by the conflicts 
between fund management and shareholders? We hypothesize that the underperformance and 
excessive asset gathering of publicly traded asset management firms may also be induced by 
the short-termist pressures associated with a stock listing. As argued by Narayanan (1985), 
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Miller and Rock (1985), Stein (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Von Thadden (1995), and 
Holmström (1999), a focus on a firm’s short term profits or current stock price will distort 
firm decisions from the first-best if investors have incomplete information on how the firm 
should grow to maximize its long term value. Short-termist pressures may induce excessive 
asset gathering, since asset gathering boosts current fee revenues (and hence current firm 
earnings) at the expense of future returns (and hence future earnings). 
To test the short-termism view, we follow Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) 
and compute earnings response coefficients or ERCs (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and 
Zmijewski, 1989). ERCs measure the sensitivity of stock returns to firm earnings. We 
compute ERCs using firm level regressions for all listed firms with at least eight quarters of 
earnings information from I/B/E/S. We argue that if short-termism explains fund 
underperformance, then we should find that the underperformance is concentrated in funds 
managed by firms with high ERCs. This is indeed what we find. Table 8 reports the excess 
returns and alphas of portfolios of hedge funds managed by listed firms with high versus low 
ERCs. The sample period for the sort extends from January 2000 to December 2013 and 
corresponds to the period where there are at least ten funds in each of the high ERC and low 
ERC fund portfolios. We find that the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms 
relative to those managed by unlisted firms is centered around high ERC firms. Specifically, 
after adjusting for covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the high ERC 
portfolio (Portfolio A1) underperforms the unlisted portfolio (Portfolio B) by 2.68 percent per 
year (t-statistic = 3.13) while the low ERC portfolio (Portfolio A2) delivers a risk-adjusted 
return that is statistically indistinguishable from that of Portfolio B.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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In unreported results that are available upon request, we also show using a probit 
regression on the probability of fund launch post firm listing that in any given year, high ERC 
firms are 37 percent more likely to launch new funds than are low ERC firms. Moreover, 
during our sample period, high ERC firms raise more capital than do low ERC firms. Indeed, 
despite their underperformance, high ERC firms manage on average US$789.47 million more 
than do low ERC firms. Taken together, these findings indicate that the short-termism 
pressures associated with public listings partly explain the underperformance and excessive 
asset gathering of listed fund management companies. 
1.3.6. Fund operational risk 
Why do hedge fund investors continue to subscribe to hedge funds managed by listed 
firms in light of their persistent underperformance? One view is that given the level of 
transparency that is required of a publicly listed firm, hedge funds managed by listed firms 
score better in terms of operational risk metrics. Therefore, investors in such funds may be 
trading investment performance for lower operational risk.  
To investigate, we leverage on work by Bollen and Pool (2012) who identify 
performance flags that are associated with the risk that a hedge fund is a fraud. We focus on 
the four performance flags with the highest rejection rates for reporting violations in the 
Bollen and Pool (2012) sample.
21
 They are (i) Kink, which is triggered when a fund reports a 
return distribution with a discontinuity at zero, (ii) Maxrsq, which is triggered when a fund 
has an adjusted R-squared that is not significantly different from zero, (iii) % Negative, 
which is triggered when a fund reports a low number of negative returns, (iv) % Repeat, 
which is triggered when a fund reports a high number of repeated returns. We report in Table 
9, the percentage of hedge funds managed by listed firms and by unlisted firms that trigger 
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 See Panel B of Table 5 in Bollen and Pool (2012). 
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any one of the above-mentioned performance flags at the ten percent significance level, as 
well as the difference in rejection frequencies between the two groups of funds.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 indicates that hedge funds managed by listed firms are less likely to trigger 
three of the four performance flags. Specifically, funds managed by listed firms compare 
favorably to funds managed by unlisted firms based on Kink, % Negative, and % Repeat. 
They are 3.6 percent less likely to report distributions with a discontinuity at zero, 3.2 percent 
less likely to report a low number of negative returns, and 7.7 percent less likely to report a 
high number of repeated returns. Moreover, the differences in rejection rates are statistically 
significant at the one percent level for these three indicators of fraud risk. These results 
suggest that hedge funds managed by listed firms may offer lower operational risk relative to 
their competitors managed by unlisted firms.  
1.3.7.  Endogeneity of firm listing status 
Does the endogeneity of firm listing engender the underperformance of hedge funds 
managed by public firms? Systematic differences may exist between firms that list and those 
that do not. These differences could impact both the propensity to list and fund investment 
performance. The event study in Section 3.2, by analyzing within firm variation in listing 
status, addresses concerns that the spread in investment performance may be driven by time-
invariant differences between private and public firms. Similarly, the differences-in-
differences methodology that we employ in the event study allows us to ameliorate concerns 
that observed time-varying differences between listed and unlisted firms are responsible for 
the spread in investment performance.  
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Still, our findings leave open the possibility that unobserved time-varying differences 
between public and private firms might simultaneously affect the decision to go public and 
fund investment performance. To address this concern, we complement our event study with 
an instrumental variables analysis. The instrument that we use, i.e., firm strategy flow at 
founding, is motivated by Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist’s (2015) choice of VC supply 
at founding to instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy 
flow of the first fund conceived by the firm in the two-year period post firm inception.
22
 We 
argue that the ability to attract capital at inception allows a firm to quickly reach critical mass 
and sets the stage for a possible public listing several years later. The first-stage results in 
Column 1 of Table 10 confirm this prediction. The supply of capital around the time of firm 
founding is a positive and significant predictor of a firm’s listing status with an F-statistic of 
27.30.  
The exclusion restriction is that conditional on covariates, firm strategy flow in the 
two-year period after inception only affects fund investment performance through its impact 
on firm’s listing status.  One concern is that early firm strategy flow may drive future strategy 
returns via strategy-level capacity constraints (Naik, Ramadorai, and Strömqvist, 2007). 
However the fact that the median firm age at listing in our sample is 8.08 years helps alleviate 
this concern.
23
 Capital accumulation between 6.08 to 8.08 years earlier should have little 
impact on a fund’s investment performance today. Our approach is reminiscent of that used 
by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015) who rely on 
the separation of time to motivate the exclusion requirement. Moreover, in unreported results, 
we find that higher strategy flow over the last two years is not a reliable harbinger of lower 
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 Specifically, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) use as their instrument the total number of firms 
receiving first-round VC funding in a firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded. Likewise, we 
use firm strategy flow in the two-year period after firm inception. 
23
 To accommodate our choice of instrument, we remove all firms that list within two years of firm inception for 
the instrumental variables analysis.  
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future strategy returns. Therefore, our use of strategy flow as opposed to strategy AUM 
allows us to sidestep concerns related to strategy-level capacity constraints.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10, we report the second stage results for the fund return 
and alpha equations, respectively. After instrumenting for firm listing status, hedge funds 
managed by publicly listed firms continue to underperform those managed by private firms 
by 21.89 percent per annum before adjusting for risk and by 33.20 percent per annum after 
adjusting for risk. A comparison to the equivalent naïve OLS estimates in Columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 10 indicates that these point estimates are larger in absolute terms after instrumenting 
for listing status. Taken together, these findings suggest that the endogeneity of a firm’s 
listing status is unlikely to drive the observed differences in investment performance between 
hedge funds managed by public versus private firms.  
 
1.4.  Robustness tests 
In this section, we present a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our 
empirical results.  
1.4.1.  Backfill bias 
Funds managed by unlisted firms may backfill their returns more often than funds 
managed by listed firms. In response to concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, 
Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we confine the analysis to TASS and HFR funds 
for which we have the date that the fund listed on the databases (only TASS and HFR provide 
this information). Next, we redo the baseline Table 2 portfolio sort for this subset of funds 
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and for those returns at or after the respective fund listing date. As there are not enough funds 
with returns post-listing in the cross-section during the earlier years, we perform the analysis 
for the period after 1996. As shown in Panel A of Table 11, our inferences remain unchanged 
when we control for backfill bias in this fashion. As an alternative, we also remove the first 
24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for backfill and incubation bias. The portfolio 
alpha spread remains economically meaningful and statistically significant at the one percent 
level with this adjustment.   
[Insert Table 11 here] 
1.4.2. Serial correlation 
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for 
infrequently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or in some cases, 
deliberate performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that 
we use to make inferences from the sort results. To allay such concerns, we unsmooth fund 
returns using the algorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 2 
portfolio sort. The results reported in Panel B of Table 11 indicate that our findings are not 
driven by serial correlation in fund returns.  
1.4.3. Pre-fee returns 
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees in the commercial databases. One concern 
is that funds managed by listed firms may charge higher fees than funds managed by unlisted 
firms. This may drive the underperformance of the former relative to the latter. To check, we 
calculate fund performance and management fee using the algorithm outlined in Appendix A 
of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), and back out pre-fee fund returns. As shown in Panel C 
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of Table 11, the baseline portfolio sort spreads are even greater when we analyze pre-fee fund 
returns. 
1.4.4. Dynamic risk exposures 
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant 
over time. As a result, the risk-adjustment for the portfolio sorts may not be accurate. To 
account for dynamic factor loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using a rolling 24-
month window and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month 
forward. The results from the risk exposures calculated using the rolling window approach 
are presented in Panel D of Table 11. They indicate that our findings are robust to catering for 
dynamic risk exposures.  
1.4.5. Omitted risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the portfolio sort analysis. Relative 
to funds managed by listed firms, those managed by unlisted firms could be loading up more 
on some risk factor (e.g., emerging markets) that did well over the sample period. This could 
explain why there is a return spread between funds managed by unlisted firms and those 
managed by listed firms. Hence, we augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with an 
emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return and redo the 
Table 2 sort. To cater for hedge fund exposure to option based strategies (Mitchell and 
Pulvino, 2001), we also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the out-of-the-
money S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) 
model.
24
 Finally, to account for hedge fund exposure to liquidity risk (Teo, 2011; Aragon and 
Strahan, 2012; Sadka, 2012), we augment the Fung and Hsieh model with the Pástor and 
                                                          
24
 We are grateful to Vikas Agarwal for supplying these factors.  
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Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The results presented in Panels E, F, and G of Table 11 
indicate that our baseline results are not driven by the presence of omitted risk factors. 
1.4.6. Hedge fund termination 
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have 
terminated their operations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. To allay such concerns, 
we assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its return is -10 percent. 
Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel H 
of Table 11, with that adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios in the 
baseline sort fall but the spread remains economically and statistically significant. We also 
experimented with more extreme termination returns of -20 percent and -30 percent, and 
obtain qualitatively similar results. These findings suggest that the baseline results are robust 
to the self-reporting and delisting biases inherent in hedge fund data. 
1.4.7. Subsample analysis 
To understand how the underperformance of funds managed by listed firms varies 
over time, we split the sample period into two subperiods: January 1994 to December 2003 
and January 2004 to December 2013. Next we redo the Table 2 portfolio sort analysis for 
each subperiod. The results reported in Panels I and J of Table 11 indicate that funds 
managed by listed firms underperform those managed by unlisted firms in both subperiods. 
The risk-adjusted performance spread is largely unchanged when we go from the earlier 
subperiod (2.97 percent per year) to the later subperiod (3.07 percent per year). Moreover, 
both spreads are statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
     31 
  
1.4.8. Manager manipulation of hedge fund returns 
 Funds managed by listed firms, due to the higher level of transparency required of 
them, may be less inclined to misreport their returns than funds managed by unlisted firms. If 
the former are less likely to inflate returns than the latter, this may explain the apparent 
underperformance of the former when we analyze self-reported returns from commercial 
hedge fund databases. To address this concern, we construct firm returns from firm stock 
holdings reported in the Thomson Financial 13-F holdings data. We argue that there is less 
scope for manipulation in the verifiable 13-F filings data that are reported to the SEC. The 
baseline portfolio sort results from returns derived from stock holdings data are presented in 
Panel L of Table 11. Since these results are constructed at the firm level, we also present the 
baseline portfolio sort results from firm returns in Panel K of Table 11 for completeness. The 
number of firms at the end of our sample falls by 88 percent when we analyze the sample of 
firm returns derived from stock holdings data.
25  Nonetheless, the alpha of the spread 
portfolio reported in Panel L of Table 11 indicate that manager manipulation of hedge fund 
returns does not drive our results. 
1.4.9. Mutual fund performance 
Hedge funds are more susceptible to agency problems than are mutual funds given 
that hedge funds engage in more complex investment strategies and offer less disclosure and 
lower transparency to their investors. Therefore the agency view predicts that the 
underperformance of mutual funds managed by public firms (relative to those managed by 
private firms) will be more modest than that of hedge funds managed by public firms. That is 
                                                          
25
 This is because our sample of hedge funds includes funds invested exclusively in non-US equities such as 
European focused funds, small equity long/short funds that have less than US$100 million in US equity 
exposure and are therefore not required to report their quarterly holdings to the SEC, in addition to other funds 
that do not have single-stock exposure as part of their investment style mandate such as fixed income, distressed 
debt, and macro funds, as well as commodity trading advisors.  
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precisely what we find when we analyze the returns of actively managed U.S. equity mutual 
funds from the CRSP survivorship bias-free mutual fund database. Specifically, we replicate 
our Table 2 portfolio sort results with mutual funds but instead of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
seven-factor model, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to adjust for risk. 
26
The 
untabulated results, which are available upon request, indicate that on average mutual funds 
managed by listed firms underperform mutual funds managed by unlisted firms by a modest 
43 basis points per year (t-statistic = 2.52) after adjusting for covariation with the four factors. 
When we value-weight the funds within each portfolio using fund total net assets (henceforth 
TNA), the spread increases to 114 basis points per year (t-statistic = 3.82). These results lend 
credence to the view that the investment underperformance of listed asset management firms 
is not germane only to the hedge fund industry.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
Our empirical results paint a consistent story. We show that hedge funds managed by 
listed asset management firms consistently underperform funds managed by their unlisted 
competitors. The results are driven by agency problems at fund management companies. 
Hedge funds that are less affected by the conflicts between fund management and fund 
investors, such as funds with high manager total deltas, with high governance scores, and 
with manager co-investment, underperform less when their management companies go public. 
Asset management firms that are especially prone to short-termist pressures from 
shareholders underperform more than firms that are more insulated from such pressures. The 
agency problems at hedge funds managed by listed firms translate into a tendency to 
                                                          
26
 At the start of our sample period, i.e., in 1994, there are 199 mutual funds managed by listed firms and 302 
mutual funds managed by unlisted firms. At the end of our sample period, i.e., in 2013, there are 574 mutual 
funds operated by public firms and 697 mutual funds operated by private firms. 
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aggressively raise capital by growing the AUM of new products. These capital raising 
activities in turn engender underperformance. We show that funds that have the greatest 
scope for asset gathering, as a consequence of their low liquidity risk levels, also exhibit the 
greatest underperformance. Hedge fund investors that continue to subscribe to funds managed 
by listed firms trade investment performance for the comfort of lower operational risk. These 
results enrich our understanding of agency forces at work in the asset management industry.   
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Chapter 2: 
Overpriced Stocks and Hedge Fund 
Performance 
 
 
 
Lin Sun 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Using the mispricing measure constructed by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), I find that 
propensity to hold mispriced stocks reflect hedge fund managerial ability. Hedge funds hold 
most overpriced stocks underperform hedge funds hold least overpriced stocks by 3.00% per 
annual after adjusting for risk. Propensity of hedge funds to hold more overpriced stock is 
persistent over the next quarter. Hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks are more prone 
to disposition effect and trade more actively. 
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2.1. Introduction  
Hedge fund asset has grown rapidly in recent twenty years; the asset under 
management (AUM) is close US$ 3 trillion mark
27
. Unlike the evidence in mutual fund 
industry, numerous hedge fund researches have shown that hedge fund managers are able to 
deliver positive risk adjusted return
28
. In asset management industry, hedge fund industry 
always attracts the best talents. Does talent hedge funds managers better at picking stocks? In 
this paper, I will investigate hedge fund managers stock picking skills through analyzing their 
holding of overpriced stocks. 
Miller (1977) argues that there is no room for undervalued securities in a market with 
large number of well informed investors. However there may have a few overvalued 
investments when those investors are unwilling to sell short the stocks. Miller’s argument 
suggests that there is a possibility that stock prices deviate from their fundamental value.  
To investigate hedge funds holding of mispriced stocks, I analyze the hedge fund 
holding by using Thomas Reuter’s Institutional (13f) Holdings database. Recently, there are a 
few papers studying the hedge fund managerial skill and investment styles through their 
mandatory 13F filing with SEC. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge funds are riding on 
the overpricing instead of correcting it (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)). Later work by 
Griffin and Xu (2009) finds that hedge funds are not better than mutual funds at long equity 
investment. Most recent researches find skill hedge fund managers when they delay their 13F 
fillings (Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2012),) and when they implement contrarian 
strategies (Grinblatt, Jostova, Petrasek, and Philipov (2016)).   
                                                          
27
 See, “Hedge-Fund Assets Below $3 Trillion for First Time Since 2014” Bloomberg, 26 Feb 2016 
28
 See Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang (1999), 
Agarwal and Naik (2000a, b, c), Fung and Hsieh (2004), Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), and Fung, Hsieh, 
Naik, and Ramadorai (2008). 
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Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) use 11 asset pricing anomalies that survive 
adjustments for Fama and French (1993) three factors to construct an aggregated measure of 
mispricing for each stock. I use the value weighted average of overpricing measure for all 
stocks held by hedge fund manager as my measure of manager mispricing. Hedge funds have 
higher level of mispricing measure when they are holding stocks with higher net stock issues 
(Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995)), higher composite equity issues (Daniel and 
Titman(2006)), higher accruals (Sloan (1996)), higher net operating assets (Hirshleifer, Hou, 
Teoh, and Zhang (2004)), higher asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)), higher 
investment-to-assets (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Xing (2008)), higher chance of distress 
(Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)), higher O-score (Ohlson (1980)), momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart (1997)), lower gross profitability premium (Novy-
Marx (2013)), lower return on assets (Fama and French (2006), Chen, Novy-Marx, and 
Zhang (2010), and Wang and Yu (2013)). 
Similar work by Avramov, Cheng, and Hameed (2015) use 11 market anomalies to 
identify overpriced stocks, and argue that propensity of mutual fund holding overpriced 
stocks reflects managerial skills. Mutual fund managers holding more overpriced stocks 
deliver poorer performance. The underperformance is more significant during high sentiment 
period. They also show that mutual funds holding most overpriced stocks attract higher 
inflow. Moreover managers buy more overpriced stocks when there is a fund inflow and sell 
less overpriced stocks when there is a fund outflow. Motivated by their work, I investigate 
the impact of stock holding mispricing on hedge fund performance. Hedge fund industry is an 
interesting laboratory to explore the relationship between stock mispricing level and hedge 
fund performance. Comparing to mutual funds, hedge funds invest in smaller, opaque value 
securities, and have higher turnover and more active share bets (Griffin and Xu (2011)). 
Empirical evidence suggests that hedge funds managers are more skillful than mutual fund 
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managers. In this paper, I propose a behavior type explanation on the underperformance of 
professional investors holding more overpriced stocks.  
The main hypothesis is that hedge fund holding of overpriced stocks reflects poorer 
managerial skills. Specifically, hedge fund holding of overpriced stocks is an indication of 
poorer stock selection skills, which contributes to a lower expected return in the next period. 
To investigate the role of behavioral bias and investment styles on performance, I further 
hypothesis that mispricing level of hedge fund holdings is positively correlated with 
behavioral bias exhibited by fund managers. As documented in existing literature, disposition 
effect (e.g. Odean (1998)) and active trading (Barber and Odean (2000, 2001)) hurt 
investment performance.  
My empirical evidence supports my hypotheses. The main finding of this paper is that 
hedge fund holding of mispriced stocks is negatively correlated with fund performance. In the 
portfolio sort analysis, hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks underperform hedge 
funds holding least overpriced stocks. The difference is 3.00% (t-statistic = 2.71) after 
adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The results are not 
confined to the smallest funds in our sample and cannot be explained by differences in fund 
age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004), fees (Agarwal, Daniel, 
and Naik, 2009), share restrictions and illiquidity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan, 2012), 
and managerial manipulation of fund returns (Bollen and Pool, 2009). 
What drives the underperformance of hedge funds holding mispriced stocks? I further 
test whether the manager behavioral bias exhibited by hedge fund manager can explain the 
underperformance. In line with Odean (1998) and Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), I observe 
that hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks are more prone to disposition effects and 
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trade more actively than hedge funds holding least overpriced stocks. Disposition effects and 
active trading lead to lower performance.  
Does the hedge fund manager holding of overpriced stocks persist overtime? Does the 
outperformance persist over longer time? My finding indicates that the last quarter mispricing 
level predicts a positive current quarter mispricing level. The results suggest that there is 
persistence in the holding of overpriced stocks. I also observe that the underperformance of 
hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks is persist up to a 36 months. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper provides new 
evidence on hedge fund manager stock picking skills through their holding of mispriced 
stocks. Hedge funds holding least overpriced stocks outperform. This finding helps investor 
to identify skilled managers (Griffin and Xu, 2009; Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang, 2012; 
Grinblatt, Jostova, Petrasek, and Philipov, 2016). Second, my work finds that hedge funds 
holding most overpriced stocks are also more prone to disposition effect and trade more 
actively. The results improve our understanding the role of behavioral bias on hedge fund 
investment performance (Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001). Finally, I find that 
outperformance persists over a long period of time up to 36 months. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis while Section 4 
presents a myriad of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.2. Data and methodology 
I evaluate the impact of hedge funds using monthly net–of–fee returns and assets 
under management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and 
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BarclayHedge datasets from January 1994 to December 2013. Because TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information 
on funds that died before January 1994. This gives rise to survivorship bias. To mitigate this 
bias, I only focus on data from January 1994 onward. 
I merge the data for hedge funds from three hedge fund databases: TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge. First, I match hedge funds by their names. Second, I identify multiple share 
classes whose pairwise monthly return correlations are more than 0.99. Since multiple share 
classes may cloud our analysis, I exclude multiple share classes by keeping the funds based 
on the following priority rule: (i) longest return series, (ii) largest AUM, (iii) USD share class, 
and (iv) onshore share class. The final sample has a total of 16,633 hedge funds, 5,745 of 
which are live funds and 10,888 of which are dead funds at the end of our sample. 
I obtain the hedge fund managers’ quarterly holding from Thomas Reuter’s 
Institutional (13f) Holdings database. Since 1978, all institutions with over $100 million 
under management are required to fill out 13F forms quarterly for all U.S. equity positions 
worth over $200,000 or consisting of more than 10,000 shares29. To identify the hedge fund 
manager from the 13F fillings, I merge the 13F manager name with the merged hedge fund 
database. Following the work by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), I require (1) that at least 50% 
of its clients are “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net worth 
individuals,” and (2) that it charges performance-based fees, according to Form ADV. I am 
able to identify 826 hedge funds managers in 13F database.  
The mispricing measure is taken from Robert F. Stambaugh data library. At the end of 
each month, Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2015)
30
 constructed the mispricing measure by 
                                                          
29
 As discussed in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), Griffin and Xu (2009), and Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang 
(2013). 
30
 See http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaugh/Mispricing_Measure_Documentation.pdf 
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combining 11 anomaly variables. They assign a rank of 0 to 100 for each of the 11 anomaly 
variables. A higher rank indicates a higher degree of overpricing and lower expected return in 
the next period. The aggregated measure is the arithmetic mean value of these 11 anomalies. 
These 11 variables are: net stock issues (Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995)), 
composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman(2006)), accruals (Sloan (1996)), net operating 
assets (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004)), asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill 
(2008)), investment-to-assets (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Xing (2008)), distress (Campbell, 
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)), O-score (Ohlson (1980)), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), Carhart (1997)), gross profitability premium (Novy-Marx (2013)), return on assets 
(Fama and French (2006), Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010), and Wang and Yu (2013)). 
I merge the 13F data with Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2015) mispricing measure by 
PERMNO. Quarterly hedge fund manager level mispricing measure is constructed as the 
value weighted mean mispricing of all the individual stocks.  
Throughout this paper, I model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven–factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as 
the difference between the Russell 2000 and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 indices; the 
yield spread of the US ten–year Treasury bond over the three–month Treasury bill, adjusted 
for duration of the ten–year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s 
BAA bond over the ten–year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration 
(BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on 
currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are 
constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see 
Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been 
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shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund 
returns. 
To further enhance the results, I also used the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1997, DGTW) method to adjust for risk. DGTW adjusted return for individual stock is the 
excess return of 125 benchmark portfolios based on market capitalization, book-to-market 
ratio, and momentum stocks. I calculate the hedge fund firm level DGTW adjusted return by 
taking the value weighted mean value of all the stocks. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the mispricing measures at hedge fund 
manager level and other hedge fund characteristics.  On average, hedge funds tend to hold 
less overprice stocks. The mean and median values of overpricing measure (MISP) are 42.72 
and 43.87 respectively, which are less the unconditional expected value of 50.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.3. Empirical analysis 
2.3.1. Tests of fund performance 
To begin, I test for differences in risk–adjusted performance of hedge funds with 
diffident level of overpricing. Every quarter, starting in January 1998, five hedge fund 
portfolios are formed based on overpricing at the beginning of each quarter.  The post–
formation returns on these five portfolios are linked across months to form a single return 
series for each portfolio. I then evaluate the performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung 
and Hsieh (2004) model. I also report the DGTW adjusted return.  
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The results, reported in Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected returns, on 
the portfolios sorted by different level of overpricing, that are unexplained by the DGTW 
style portfolio and the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds hold most 
overpriced stocks underperform those hold least overpriced stocks by an economically and 
statistically significant 3.26 percent per year (t–statistic = 2.64). As in the rest of the paper, I 
base statistical inferences on White (1980) heteroskedasticity–consistent standard errors. 
After adjusting for co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the 
spread increases to 3.00 percent per year (t–statistic = 2.71). To confirm the result, I also test 
the cross sectional difference in performance based on hedge fund 13F holding data. The 
difference in holding return is economically and statistically significant at 6.02 percent per 
year (t–statistic = 2.61). After adjusting for DGTW benchmark portfolio, the difference gives 
an economically and statistically significant 4.48 percent per year (t–statistic = 2.50). 
[Insert Table 2 and Fig 1 here] 
Figure 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly 
cumulative average residuals (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of hedge funds hold least 
overpriced stocks (portfolio A) and the portfolio of hedge funds hold most overpriced stocks 
(portfolio B). CAR is the cumulative difference between a portfolio's excess return and its 
factor loadings (estimated over the entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) risk factors (left panel) or DGTW adjusted return (right panel). The CARs in Figure 1 
indicate that portfolio B consistently underperforms portfolio A over the entire sample period 
and suggest that the underperformance of funds holding most overpriced stocks is not 
peculiar to a particular year. 
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To further test the relationship between hedge fund performance and propensity to 
hold mispriced stocks, I estimate the following pooled OLS regression by controlling for fund 
characteristics that may affect fund performance: 
𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻𝐴𝑖𝑚 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑃 + 𝑐𝑀𝐺𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑑𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑒𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝑓𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +
𝑔log(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑚−1) + ℎ𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝑖
𝑙𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑙
𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚,
 
(1) 
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co–variation with the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, MISP is the hedge fund last quarter’s mispricing level, 
MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in 
percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notification period in months, MININV is fund 
minimum investment in millions of US$, SIZE is fund monthly AUM in millions of US$, 
AGE is fund age in decades, and YEARDUM is year dummy. The log(SIZE) variable captures 
capacity constraints at the fund level (Berk and Green, 2004). MGTFEE and PERFFEE 
captures the impact of fund incentives on managerial performance (Agarwal, Daniel, and 
Naik, 2009) while NOTICE caters for the view expounded by Aragon (2007) that funds with 
longer redemption notification periods take on more liquidity risk and therefore harvest 
greater returns. I include AGE as a response to the Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) finding that 
younger funds outperform older funds. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, I only 
include results for funds with at least 24 months of return data. I also estimate the analogous 
regression on raw monthly fund returns to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of the 
risk adjustment methodology.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The results from the cross–sectional regression analysis are reported in columns one 
to four of Table 3. They corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts and indicate that 
funds charge zero performance fee underperform those charge non-zero performance fee. 
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Specifically, the coefficient estimate on MISP in the alpha regression reported in column four 
of Table 2 indicates that, controlling for other factors that could explain fund performance, 
funds holding more overpriced stocks underperform funds holding less overpriced after 
adjusting for risk. The underperformance is both statistically and economically significant. 
One standard derivation increase in MISP is corresponding to an 8.07% underperformance 
per annual. The coefficient estimates on the control variables accord with the extant literature. 
Longer redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) is associated with superior performance 
while fund size (Berk and Green, 2004) and fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) are linked 
to poorer performance. Inferences do not change when I estimate the regression on raw 
returns suggesting that my findings are not driven by our risk adjustment technology.    
To check for robustness, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of 
the OLS regressions. Specifically, first I run cross–sectional regressions for each month. 
Then, I report the time–series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time–series 
standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth regressions 
control for correlation in residuals across different firms within the same month. I compute 
the standard errors using the method of Newey and West (1987) with a three–month lag to 
adjust for dependence across time. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in 
columns five to eight of Table 3 echo our previous findings and indicate that they are robust 
to alternative model specifications.  
2.3.2. Behavioral bias and investment style 
Will hedge fund managers’ investment behavior affect their decision to hold more 
overpriced stocks? I conduct a univariate analysis on behavioral bias and fund to examine the 
difference investment behavior between hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks and 
least overpriced stocks. 
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I use five difference measures of investment styles and factor exposures: disposition 
effect by Odean (1998), active shares by Cremers and Petajisto (2009), R-squared estimated 
from Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7 factor model, strategy distinctiveness index based on Sun, 
Wang, and Zheng (2012), and deviation of Fung and Hsieh 7 factor beta loading from the 
hedge fund strategy peers used in Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016). Odean (1998) shows that retail 
investors who demonstrate disposition effect leads to lower investment returns. Later work by 
Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) suggest that active trading is hazardous to wealth. Some 
recent works examine the relationship between fund distinctiveness and performance. Titman 
and Tiu (2011) find that low R-squared funds have better performance than high R-squared 
funds measuring by Sharpe ratio, information ratio, and manipulation-proof performance. 
They argue that better-informed managers will choose less exposure to factor risk. In line 
with their findings, Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) examine the hedge fund’s return 
distinctiveness with respective to its strategy peers. They find that those more distinct funds 
outperform. As a supplementary to the R-squared and strategy distinctiveness index, I 
calculate the hedge fund’s sum of absolute Fung and Hsieh (2004) beta difference from its 
peers by following the work by Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results from the univariate analysis are presented in Table 6. The findings suggest 
that hedge fund holding most overpriced stocks are more prone to disposition effect than 
hedge funds holding least overpriced stocks by 2.4% (t–statistic = 2.72). Moreover, hedge 
funds holding most overpriced stocks trade more actively than hedge funds holding least 
overpriced stocks measured by RSQUARED, SDI and BETADEVIATION. Specifically, 
hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks have 1.3% lower R-squared, distinct 2% more, 
and deviate 9.3% more than hedge funds holding least overpriced stocks. All these results are 
statistically significant at 1% level. Taken together, the result suggest that hedge funds 
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holding most overpriced stocks are more prone to disposition effect and take excess trading, 
which lead to poorer performance.  
2.3.3. Double sort on size and mispricing level 
 To investigate the role of capacity constraint (Berk and Green, 2004) on mispricing, I 
conduct a double sort analysis on hedge fund size and mispricing level.  
 The results are presented in Table 5. I find that the alpha spread between hedge funds 
holding most overpriced stocks and least overpriced stocks is more significant for larger 
hedge funds. The alpha spread increases from 3.00% from 3.69%. The results suggest that 
underperformance of hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks are servicer when they are 
facing capacity constraint.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
2.3.4. Persistence of hedge fund mispricing  
To assess the persistence in overpricing, I run OLS regression of current quarter 
mispricing level on last quarter mispricing level, together with other control variables from 
previous quarter including: return, alpha, fund flow, management fee, performance fee, 
redemption notification period, minimum investment in millions of US$,  age in decades, 
AUM in millions of US$, and standard deviation of return.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results in Table 6 suggest that there is a strong positive correlation of lagged 
mispricing level with current mispricing level at quarterly frequency. The coefficient is 0.685 
(t–statistic = 64.31).  
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2.3.5. Alternative portfolio sorting and holding period  
In my baseline results in table 2, my portfolio formation period is the latest quarterly 
13F holding and my holding period is 3 months. To test the robustness of my results, I apply 
alternative portfolio formation and holding periods to my baseline results. Specifically, I use 
three sets of portfolio formation period including: last quarter, last 4 quarters, and last 8 
quarters. I calculate the mean value of the past mispricing level based on hedge fund 
managers’ quarterly 13F filings. The alternative portfolio holding periods include: 3 months, 
6 months, 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months.  
The results are presented in Table 7. First, the alpha spread between hedge funds 
holding most overpriced stocks and hedge fund holding least overpriced stock remain 
statistically and economically significant at 3.00%, 3.19% and 3.43% for portfolio formation 
period of 1 quarter, 4 quarters and 8 quarters respectively. Second, underperformance shows 
a decreasing trend and remains significant when I vary the holding period from 3 months to 
36 months. Taken together, the findings suggest that the underperformance of hedge funds 
holding most overpriced stocks is robust for alternative holding periods and the 
underperformance is persistent up to 36 months. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
2.4. Robustness tests 
In this section, I present a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our 
empirical results.  
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2.4.1. Backfill bias 
Funds managed by unlisted firms may backfill their returns more often than funds 
managed by listed firms. In response to concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, 
Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, I redo my baseline analysis by removing the 
first 24 months of return data for each fund. As there are not enough funds with returns post-
listing in the cross-section during the earlier years, I perform the analysis for the period after 
2000. As shown in Panel A of Table 8, my inferences remain unchanged when I control for 
backfill bias in this fashion. The portfolio alpha spread remains economically meaningful and 
statistically significant at the one percent level with this adjustment.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
2.4.2. Serial correlation 
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for 
infrequently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or in some cases, 
deliberate performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that 
I use to make inferences from the sort results. To allay such concerns, I unsmooth fund 
returns using the algorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 2 
portfolio sort. The results reported in Panel B of Table 8 indicate that my findings are not 
driven by serial correlation in fund returns.  
2.4.3. Pre-fee returns 
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees in the commercial databases. One concern 
is that funds holding most overpriced stocks may charge higher fees than funds holding least 
overpriced stocks. This may drive the underperformance of the former relative to the latter. 
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To check, I calculate fund performance and management fee using the algorithm outlined in 
Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), and back out pre-fee fund returns. As 
shown in Panel C of Table 8, the baseline portfolio sort spreads are even greater when I 
analyze pre-fee fund returns. 
2.4.4. Omitted risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the portfolio sort analysis. Relative 
to funds holding most overpriced stocks, those holding least overpriced stocks could be 
loading up more on some risk factor (e.g., emerging markets) that did well over the sample 
period. This could explain why there is a return spread between funds managed by unlisted 
firms and those managed by listed firms. Hence, I augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model 
with an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return and 
redo the Table 2 sort. To cater for hedge fund exposure to option based strategies (Mitchell 
and Pulvino, 2001), I also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with out-of-the-money 
S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model.
31
 
Finally, to account for hedge fund exposure to liquidity risk (Teo, 2011; Aragon and Strahan, 
2012; Sadka, 2012), I augment the Fung and Hsieh model with the Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor. The results presented in Panels D, E, and F of Table 8 indicate that 
our baseline results are not driven by the presence of omitted risk factors. 
2.4.5. Fund termination 
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have 
terminated their operations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. To allay such concerns, I 
assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its return is -10 percent. 
                                                          
31
 I am grateful to Vikas Agarwal for supplying these factors.  
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Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel G 
of Table 8, with that adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios in the 
baseline sort fall but the spread remain economically and statistically significant. I also 
experimented with more extreme termination returns of -20 percent and -30 percent, and 
obtain qualitatively similar results. These findings suggest that the baseline results are robust 
to the self-reporting and delisting biases inherent in hedge fund data. 
2.4.6. Subsample analysis 
It will be interesting to understand how the underperformance of funds managed by 
listed firms varies over time. In that effort, I split the sample period into two sub periods: 
January 1998 to December 2005 and January 2006 to December 2013. Next I redo the Table 
2 portfolio sort analysis for each sub period. The results reported in Panels H and I of Table 8 
indicate that funds holding most overpriced stocks underperform those holding least 
overpriced stocks in both sub periods. The risk-adjusted performance spread is decreased 
when we go from the earlier sub period (4.32 percent per year) to the later sub period (2.24 
percent per year). Moreover, both spreads are statistically significant.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the relationship between hedge fund manager holding of 
mispriced stocks and their investment performance. First, I show that hedge funds holding 
most overpriced stocks underperform hedge funds holding least overpriced stocks by 3.00% 
per annual after adjusting for risk. Second, the propensity of hedge funds to hold overpriced 
stocks persists over next quarter. Third, hedge funds holding most overpriced stocks are more 
prone to disposition effect and trade more actively than hedge funds holding least overpriced 
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stocks. Last, the results hold for alternative portfolio formation and holding period. There 
results contribute our understanding of the impact of hedge fund holding overpriced stock on 
the investment performance.  
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Chapter 3: 
On the Performance of Hedge Funds 
Charging Zero Performance Fee 
 
 
 
Lin Sun 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Hedge funds charging zero performance fee significantly underperform hedge funds charging 
non-zero performance fee by 3.79% per annual. Hedge funds charging zero performance fee 
take higher systematic risk, invest less distinctively relative to their peers, and implement 
more scalable strategies. The presence of a performance fee increases the flow-performance 
sensitivity in both the low performance and high performance terciles. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 Hedge fund asset has grown rapidly in recent twenty years; the asset under 
management (AUM) is close US$ 3 trillion mark
32
. Unlike the evidence in mutual fund 
industry, numerous hedge fund researches have shown that hedge fund managers are able to 
deliver positive risk adjusted return
33
. In asset management industry, hedge fund industry 
always attracts the best talents. They are also more expensive than mutual fund managers. A 
typical hedge fund charges: 1. a 2% management fee on fund AUM; 2. a 20% performance 
fee on the profit earned if the fund return hit the hurdle rate and high water mark. Numerous 
evidences show that this convex compensation scheme is more complex than I was expected. 
It not only incentivizes managers to deliver better performance, but also motivates them to 
take higher risk and engage in more frauds. However none of the previous research has 
looked at an important group of the hedge funds – hedge funds charging zero performance 
fee. In this paper, I will investigate the performance, risk taking, investment styles, and 
investor’s reaction of this group of hedge funds. This unique setting enables me to separate 
performance fee and management fee from the convex compensation scheme. The 
performance and investment behavior will give us better understanding the role of 
performance fee in the industry.   
 Zero performance fee hedge funds are an interesting group of hedge funds for 
investigating the role of performance fee in this industry. As a boundary condition, zero 
performance fee contracts separate the performance fee and management fee. Under the zero 
performance fee contracts, hedge fund managers can only live on the management fee. Their 
incentive is similar to that of mutual fund industry. Fund managers try to deliver good 
                                                          
32
 See, “Hedge-Fund Assets Below $3 Trillion for First Time Since 2014” Bloomberg, 26 Feb 2016 
33
 See Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang 
(1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000a, b, c), Fung and Hsieh (2004), Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), and Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008). 
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performance to attract more capital inflows. I conduct a portfolio sort analysis on whether 
hedge funds charging performance fee. Consist to the previous literature, I find that less 
incentivized zero performance fee hedge funds underperform better incentivized non-zero 
performance fee funds by 3.87% per annual on risk adjusted basis. The results are not 
confined to the smallest funds in my sample and cannot be explained by differences in fund 
age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004), and return smoothing 
behavior (Getmansky et al. 2004).  
 Why do zero performance fee hedge funds underperform their peers so much? How 
does the investment behavior of zero performance fee hedge funds different from non-zero 
performance fee hedge funds? To answer these questions, I investigate their systematic risk 
taking (Titman and Tiu (2011)), and strategy distinctiveness of the fund (Sun et al. (2012)). 
Consistent with my conjecture, zero performance fee hedge funds are taking higher 
systematic risk and investing less distinctive from their peers. 
 How do investors react upon the recent fund performance in absence of performance 
fee? Sirri and Tuffano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find a convex flow 
performance relationship in mutual fund industry. As discussed in Getmansky et al. (2015) 
survey paper, A lot of studies show that investor fund flow has a positive relationship with 
past fund performance and managerial incentives. Similar with mutual fund investors, hedge 
fund investors are chasing positive returns and flee from negative returns (Goetzmann, et al. 
(2003), Baquero and Verbeek (2009), and Getmansky, et al. (2015)). However the flow 
performance relationship is more complex than in the mutual fund industry. In their 
discussion, common hedge funds characteristics (share restriction, minimum investment, 
lock-up period, capacity constraints, asset illiquidity and etc.) may have important impact on 
hedge funds flows. In this study, I am able to investigate the role of performance fee on 
hedge fund flow. My finding suggests that zero performance fee hedge fund investors are 
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generally less sensitive to recent performance than non-zero performance fee fund investors. 
They are stickier with recent poor performers, and less likely to chase after the recent star 
performers.  
 The most related paper of this study is the work by Agarwal et al. (2009). They study 
a special group of mutual funds implementing hedge fund strategy, which they call “hedged 
mutual fund”. They compare this group of hedge funds with traditional mutual funds and 
hedge funds. The performance of hedged mutual funds falls between the traditional mutual 
funds and hedge funds. They attribute the outperformance of hedged mutual funds to 
traditional mutual funds to the flexible investment strategies, and the outperformance of 
hedge funds to hedged mutual funds to the lighter regulation and better incentives. My setting 
is different from their works in three ways: 1. My sample consists of funds offered by hedge 
fund management companies other than mutual fund companies. 2. By looking at the 
performance fee hedge funds, I am able to role of performance fee in motivating hedge funds 
managers. 3. My samples of hedge funds enable me to study the fund flow and return 
relationship among professional hedge fund investors. 
 Results in this paper contribute to the literature in three ways. First, this paper shows 
that zero performance fee hedge funds underperform, which zero management fee hedge 
funds outperform. This result suggests that performance fee plays a more important role than 
management fee to motivate the hedge fund manager to perform well. Second, zero 
performance fee hedge funds bet on higher systematic risk and invest less distinct from their 
peers. This suggests that hedge fund managers invest in a passive manner in absence of 
performance fee. Finally, zero performance fee fund investors are less sensitive to recent poor 
and superior performance. In the absence of performance fee, fund investors are more likely 
to flee away from recent poor performance, and more likely to chase after the recent superior 
performance. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis while Section 4 
presents a myriad of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Data and methodology 
I evaluate the impact of hedge funds using monthly net–of–fee returns and assets 
under management data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge datasets from January 1994 to December 2013. Because TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information 
on funds that died before January 1994. This gives rise to survivorship bias. To mitigate this 
bias, I only focus on data from January 1994 onward. 
I merge the data for hedge funds from three hedge fund databases: TASS, HFR, and 
BarclayHedge. First, I match hedge funds by their names. Second, I identify multiple share 
classes whose pairwise monthly return correlations are more than 0.99. Since multiple share 
classes may cloud my analysis, I exclude multiple share classes by keeping the funds based 
on the following priority rule: (i) longest return series, (ii) largest AUM, (iii) USD share class, 
and (iv) onshore share class. My sample has a total of 16,633 hedge funds, 5,745 of which are 
live funds and 10,888 of which are dead funds at the end of my sample. 
Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), I classify funds into four broad 
investment styles: Security Selection, Multi–process, Directional Trader, and Relative Value. 
Security Selection funds take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued 
securities, respectively, and reduce systematic risks in the process. Usually, they take 
positions in equity markets. Multi–process funds employ multiple strategies that take 
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advantage of opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin–offs, 
mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share buybacks. 
Directional Trader funds bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, 
equities, and bonds in the futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on 
spread relations between prices of financial assets and aim to minimize market exposure.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of management companies as well 
as the number of funds and the size of the assets that they manage for zero performance fee 
hedge funds and non-zero performance fee hedge funds. While there is a decreasing market 
share of zero performance fee hedge funds, it remains a significant market share of 14% of 
total asset under management in my sample.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Throughout this paper, I model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven–factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as 
the difference between the Russell 2000 and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 indices; the 
yield spread of the US ten–year Treasury bond over the three–month Treasury bill, adjusted 
for duration of the ten–year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s 
BAA bond over the ten–year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration 
(BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on 
currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are 
constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see 
Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets. These seven factors have been 
shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund 
returns 
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3.3. Empirical analysis 
3.3.1. Tests of fund performance 
To begin, I test for differences in risk–adjusted performance between hedge funds 
charging zero performance fee and hedge funds change non-zero performance fee. Every 
month, starting in January 1994, two hedge fund portfolios are formed based on whether they 
are charging performance fee.  The post–formation returns on these two portfolios are linked 
across months to form a single return series for each portfolio. I then evaluate the 
performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.   
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected 
returns, on the portfolios sorted by whether hedge funds charging performance fee, that are 
unexplained by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds not charging 
performance fee underperform those charging performance fee by an economically and 
statistically significant 2.36 percent per year (t–statistic = 3.04). As in the rest of the paper, I 
base statistical inferences on White (1980) heteroskedasticity–consistent standard errors. 
After adjusting for co–variation with the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the 
spread increases to 3.79 percent per year (t–statistic = 7.10). Since hedge funds with investor 
capital below US$20m may not be relevant to large institutional investors, I also conduct the 
portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with at least US$20m of AUM. The results 
reported in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that my findings are not driven by the smallest funds 
in the sample. To address the concern that different manager’s ability, I conduct another 
portfolio sort analysis for hedge funds charging performance fee and not charging 
performance fee under same management company. The risk adjusted spread remains 
significant at -2.43% per year (t-statistic = 2.72).  
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[Insert Table 2 and Fig 1 here] 
Figure 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly 
cumulative average residuals (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of funds charge zero 
performance fee (portfolio A) and the portfolio of funds charge non-zero performance fee 
(portfolio B). CAR is the cumulative difference between a portfolio's excess return and its 
factor loadings (estimated over the entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) risk factors. The CARs in Figure 1 indicate that portfolio A consistently 
underperforms portfolio B over the entire sample period and suggest that the 
underperformance of funds not charging performance fee is not peculiar to a particular year. 
To further test the performance difference between funds managed by zero 
performance fee hedge funds and non-zero performance fee hedge funds, I estimate the 
following pooled OLS regression: 
𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻𝐴𝑖𝑚 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑐𝑀𝐺𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑑𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +
𝑓log(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑚−1) + 𝑔𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑘𝑆𝑇𝑌𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑙𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑙
𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚,
 
(1) 
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co–variation with the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, ZEROPERFFEE is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if the hedge fund is charging performance fee and a value of zero otherwise, 
MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notification 
period in months, MININV is fund minimum investment in millions of US$, SIZE is fund 
monthly AUM in millions of US$, AGE is fund age in decades, STYLEDUM is fund style 
dummy, and YEARDUM is year dummy. The log(SIZE) variable captures capacity constraints 
at the fund level (Berk and Green, 2004). MGTFEE captures the impact of fund incentives on 
managerial performance (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009) while NOTICE caters for the 
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view expounded by Aragon (2007) that funds with longer redemption notification periods 
take on more liquidity risk and therefore harvest greater returns. I include AGE as a response 
to the Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) finding that younger funds outperform older funds. To 
facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, I only include results for funds with at least 24 months 
of return data. I also estimate the analogous regression on raw monthly fund returns to ensure 
that my findings are not an artifact of the risk adjustment methodology.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 The results from the cross–sectional regression analysis are reported in columns one 
to four of Table 3. They corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts and indicate that 
funds charge zero performance fee underperform those charge non-zero performance fee. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimate on ZEROPERFFEE in the alpha regression reported in 
column four of Table 2 indicates that, controlling for other factors that could explain fund 
performance, funds managed charge zero performance fee underperform funds charge non-
zero performance fee by 2.10 percent per annum after adjusting for risk. The coefficient 
estimates on the control variables accord with the extant literature. Longer redemption notice 
periods (Aragon, 2007) is associated with superior performance while fund size (Berk and 
Green, 2004) and fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) are linked to poorer performance. 
Inferences do not change when I estimate the regression on raw returns suggesting that my 
findings are not driven by my risk adjustment technology.    
To check for robustness, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of 
the OLS regressions. Specifically, first I run cross–sectional regressions for each month. 
Then, I report the time–series averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time–series 
standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth regressions 
control for correlation in residuals across different firms within the same month. I compute 
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the standard errors using the method of Newey and West (1987) with a three–month lag to 
adjust for dependence across time. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in 
columns five to eight of Table 3 echo my previous findings and indicate that they are robust 
to alternative model specifications.  
3.3.2. Investment styles and factor exposure 
Given the convex compensation scheme in hedge funds industry, hedge fund manager may 
choose different investment styles given the existence of performance fee. The convex payoff 
structure may induce the hedge fund managers to increase their risk taking. Will hedge fund manager 
behavior differently in absence of incentive fee? I conduct a univariate analysis on fund investment 
styles and factor exposure to examine the difference investment behavior between hedge funds on 
whether they are charging performance fee. 
I use three difference measures of investment styles and factor exposures: R-squared 
estimated from Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7 factor model, strategy distinctiveness index based on Sun, 
Wang, and Zheng (2012), and deviation of Fung and Hsieh 7 factor beta loading from the hedge fund 
strategy peers used in Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016). Some recent works examine the relationship between 
fund distinctiveness and performance. Titman and Tiu (2011) find that low R-squared funds have 
better performance than high R-squared funds measuring by Sharpe ratio, information ratio, and 
manipulation-proof performance. They argue that better-informed managers will choose less exposure 
to factor risk. In line with their findings, Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) examine the hedge fund’s 
return distinctiveness with respective to its strategy peers. They find that those more distinct funds 
outperform. As a supplementary to the R-squared and strategy distinctiveness index, I calculate the 
hedge fund’s sum of absolute Fung and Hsieh (2004) beta difference from its peers by following the 
work by Lu, Ray, and Teo (2016). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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The results from the univariate analysis are presented in Table 4. The findings suggest that 
hedge fund charging zero performance fee have higher factor loadings, less distinctive from its peers. 
Specifically, hedge funds charging zero performance fee have 9% high R-squared, distinct 10% less, 
and deviate 3.7% less than hedge funds charging non-zero performance fee. All these results are 
statistically significant at 1% level.    
3.3.3. Capacity constraint 
Given the similar compensation scheme of mutual funds and hedge funds charging 
zero performance fees, I would expect that zero performance fee hedge fund would be less 
capacity constraint.  
In this subsection, I explore the capacity constraint for zero performance fee hedge 
funds versus non-zero performance fee hedge funds. Following the intuition of Teo (2009) 
and Yin (2016), I test the relationship between hedge fund performance and hedge fund size. 
I divide the sample into two groups: hedge funds with zero performance fee and hedge funds 
with non-zero performance fee. For each group of hedge funds, I conduct the following 
regression hedge fund ALPHA on lagged SIZE, SQUARESIZE, and control variables used in 
Table 3: 
𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻𝐴𝑖𝑚 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑆𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑀𝐺𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖
+ 𝑓𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝑔𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑘𝑆𝑇𝑌𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑘
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑙𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑙
𝑙
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑚, 
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co–variation with the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, SIZE is the natural log of fund monthly AUM in 
millions of US$, SQUARESIZE is the square of SIZE, MGTFEE is fund management fee in 
percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notification period in months, MININV is fund 
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minimum investment in millions of US$, AGE is fund age in decades, STYLEDUM is fund 
style dummy, and YEARDUM is year dummy. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results are presented in Table 5. Consistent with my prediction, the zero 
performance fee hedge funds are not capacity constrained. The coefficient of SIZE for zero 
performance fee hedge funds is -0.5%, which is statistically insignificant. The result suggests 
that there is no diseconomy of scales of fund size and fund performance. However for non-
zero performance fee hedge funds, the coefficient for SIZE is -1.6%, which is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Consistent with Teo (2009) and Yin (2016), the result suggests that 
there is a diseconomy of scale for hedge fund size on performance. In an unreported test, I 
also found that zero performance fee hedge funds charge lower management fee, require 
smaller initial investment and shorter redemption notice period. All these results are 
suggesting that non-zero performance fee hedge funds are offering more scalable strategies 
and more favorable terms to attract capital. 
3.3.4. Investor flow and past performance 
Earlier results show that hedge fund managers behavior differently in terms of 
investment style in absence of performance fee. Does investor behavior differently in absence 
of performance fee? To answer this question, I conduct fund flow analysis at quarterly 
frequency.  
As discussed in earlier section, hedge fund flow often exhibits a non-linear 
relationship with past performance. The quarterly fund net flow is defined as follow: 
𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
. 
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Following the work by Sirri and Tufano (1998), Getmansky, Liang, Schwarz, and 
Wermers (2015), I first sort the hedge fund past quarter return into a fractional rank 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 
from 0 to 1, and then I created three tercile ranks as follows: 
𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁 (
1
3
, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁 (
1
3
, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡) 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁( 
1
3
 ,
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡  − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  − 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡). 
To test the marginal effect of performance fee on fund flow and return sensitivity, I 
interact each of the three variables with the ZEROPERFFEE dummy defined in the earlier 
section. To avoid the outliers, I winsorize the top one percent of the fund flow. The following 
regression is the then conducted: 
𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑏3𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐1𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑐2𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 +
𝑐3𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑑𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 +
𝑒𝑀𝐺𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝑓𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + ℎ𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑚 +
𝑖log(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑚−1)𝑑 + 𝑗𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝑘𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝑙𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐸 +
𝑚𝐻𝑊𝑀 + 𝑛𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇 + ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑇𝑌𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑝
𝑙𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
𝑙
𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚. (3) 
All of the variables are already defined in the section 3.1 and section 3.2.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Results are presented in Table 6. The findings suggest that the fund flow performance 
relationship is convex with the presence of performance fee. All the coefficients are highly 
significant at 1% level. When the performance fee is removed (ZEROPERFFEE = 1), then 
flow performance relationship becomes an S shape. The negative and significant on 
𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸  indicates that the zero performance fee hedge 
fund investors are less sensitive to recent poor performance, which suggests that they are less 
likely to flee away from recent poor performance. Similarly, the negative and significant on 
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸  indicates that the zero performance fee hedge 
fund investors are less sensitive to recent good performance, which suggests that they are less 
likely to chase recent good performance.  
 
3.4.  Robustness tests 
In this section, I present a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of my 
empirical results.  
3.4.1. Backfill bias 
Funds charge non-zero performance fee may backfill their returns more often than 
funds charge zero performance fee. In response to concerns about backfill bias raised by 
Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, I confine the analysis to TASS and 
HFR funds for which I have the date that the fund listed on the databases (only TASS and 
HFR provide this information). Next, I redo the baseline Table 2 portfolio sort for this subset 
of funds and for those returns at or after the respective fund listing date. As there are not 
enough funds with returns post-listing in the cross-section during the earlier years, I perform 
the analysis for the period after 1996. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, my inferences remain 
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unchanged when I control for backfill bias in this fashion. The portfolio alpha spread remains 
economically meaningful and statistically significant at the one percent level with this 
adjustment.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
3.4.2. Serial correlation 
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for 
infrequently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or in some cases, 
deliberate performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that 
I use to make inferences from the sort results. To allay such concerns, I unsmooth fund 
returns using the algorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 2 
portfolio sort. The results reported in Panel B of Table 7 indicate that my findings are not 
driven by serial correlation in fund returns.  
3.4.3. Pre-fee returns 
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees in the commercial databases. One concern 
is that the fee structure may affect hedge fund performance. To allay this concern, I calculate 
fund performance and management fee using the algorithm outlined in Appendix A of 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), and back out pre-fee fund returns. As shown in Panel C of 
Table 7, the baseline portfolio sort spreads are even greater when I analyze pre-fee fund 
returns. 
3.4.4. Dynamic risk exposures 
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant 
over time. As a result, the risk-adjustment for the portfolio sorts may not be accurate. To 
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account for dynamic factor loadings, I calculate the factor loadings using a rolling 24-month 
window and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month forward. The 
results from the risk exposures calculated using the rolling window approach are presented in 
Panel D of Table 7. They indicate that my findings are robust to catering for dynamic risk 
exposures.  
3.4.5. Omitted risk factors 
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the portfolio sort analysis. Relative 
to funds managed by listed firms, those managed by unlisted firms could be loading up more 
on some risk factor (e.g., emerging markets) that did well over the sample period. This could 
explain why there is a return spread between funds managed by unlisted firms and those 
managed by listed firms. Hence, I augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with an 
emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return and redo the 
Table 2 sort. To cater for hedge fund exposure to option based strategies (Mitchell and 
Pulvino, 2001), I also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the out-of-the-money 
S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model.
34
 
Finally, to account for hedge fund exposure to liquidity risk (Teo, 2011; Aragon and Strahan, 
2012; Sadka, 2012), I augment the Fung and Hsieh model with the Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor. The results presented in Panels E, F, and G of Table 7 indicate that 
my baseline results are not driven by the presence of omitted risk factors. 
3.4.6. Fund termination 
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have 
terminated their operations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. To allay such concerns, I 
                                                          
34
 I am grateful to Vikas Agarwal for supplying these factors.  
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assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its return is -10 percent. 
Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel H 
of Table 7, with that adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios in the 
baseline sort fall but the spread remains economically and statistically significant. I also 
experimented with more extreme termination returns of -20 percent and -30 percent, and 
obtain qualitatively similar results. These findings suggest that the baseline results are robust 
to the self-reporting and delisting biases inherent in hedge fund data. 
3.4.7. Subsample analysis 
To understand how the underperformance of funds charging zero performance fee 
varies over time, I split the sample period into two subperiods: January 1994 to December 
2003 and January 2004 to December 2013. Next I redo the Table 2 portfolio sort analysis for 
each subperiod. The results reported in Panels I and J of Table 7 indicate that funds managed 
by listed firms underperform those managed by unlisted firms in both subperiods. The risk-
adjusted performance spread is largely unchanged when I go from the earlier subperiod to the 
later subperiod. Moreover, both spreads are statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 This paper studies a unique group of hedge funds – hedge funds that charging zero 
performance fees. First, I show that hedge funds charging zero performance significantly 
underperform the hedge funds charging non-zero performance fee. Second, hedge funds 
charging zero performance fee have higher systematic risk and less distinct from industry 
peers. Third, hedge funds charging zero performance are implementing more scalable 
strategies and offering more favorable terms. Last, zero performance fee hedge fund investors 
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are less sensitive to recent poor and superior performance, which exhibit a convex then 
concave fund flow and return relationship. There results contribute our understanding of the 
role of hedge fund performance fee on the investment performance, styles and investor 
reactions.  
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